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A B S T R A C T   
This study investigates the role of bidder numbers in fish auctions, a neglected area of past research and one that 
is of key importance for optimal use of limited marine resources. The study of a Norwegian auction for Atlantic 
cod shows that prices increase when two or more bidders participate in the auction. Holding other variables such 
as lot size, quality grade, and seasonality constant, price increases of 4.51 %, 6.47 %, 7.18 %, and 9.88 % in 
auctions with two, three, four, and five plus bidders were found, compared to auctions with only one bidder. The 
increasing prices following from higher bidder numbers also indicate that fishers should be incentivized to 
provide high-quality fish at the right time of importance for optimal resource use. Increased competition also 
means that, over time, winning bids will be placed by the buyers that are the most capable of adding value and 
earning profits, which also contributes to optimal resource use. Findings also show to what extent factors such as 
lot size, quality grade, fishing method (bottom trawl, longline, Danish seine), and seasonality influence the 
probability of two or more participating bidders in auctions, which should be highly relevant information for 
fishers and policy makers.   
1. Introduction 
Well-functioning ex-vessel markets for fish and other seafood are 
important for optimal resource use for at least two reasons. First, in 
competitive markets, prices should reflect the quality and quantity of 
catches, and thus fishers providing high-quality fish at the right time will 
be rewarded with high prices. If the costs associated with such fishing 
strategies do not exceed revenues, profits will be earned, incentivizing 
fishers to bring high-quality fish to the market at the right time. Second, 
in well-functioning markets, the most competitive buyers will be the 
ones that, over time, are the most capable of adding value to the fish they 
purchase and of gaining the highest returns from their customers and 
markets. 
Auctions are often used by fishers to organize ex-vessel markets to try 
to extract the maximum revenue from buyers (Fluvià et al., 2012). This 
is relevant because auction markets with many sellers and buyers are 
generally more competitive than direct sales where bargaining power 
and asymmetric information regarding product quality may distort 
prices (e.g., Blomquist et al., 2015; McEvoy et al., 2009; Sogn-Grundvåg 
et al., 2014, 2019). However, somewhat paradoxically, when fishers are 
free to choose between direct sales and auctions, the share of auction 
sales often decreases, as is the case for several European seafood auction 
markets (European Association of Fishing Ports and Auctions, 2005). 
This is also the case for the auction for frozen Atlantic cod studied here, 
where the share of auction sales decreased from 53 % in 2012 to below 
40 % in 2018, indicating an increasing preference for direct sales. 
Buyers’ valuations of a lot may depend on key characteristics such as 
the size of the lot, the species, the size of the fish, its quality grade, and 
fishing methods used (Asche et al., 2015; Fluvià et al., 2012; Gobillon 
et al., 2017; Guillioni and Bucciarelli, 2011; Hammarlund, 2015; Kris-
tofersson and Rickertsen, 2004; Kristofersson and Rickertsen, 2007; 
Sogn-Grundvåg et al., 2019, 2020). Buyers may also differ in their 
valuation of the same lots, which may depend on differences in buyers’ 
plans for what products to make for different customers and markets 
(Gobillon et al., 2017). This indicates that the characteristics of the lot 
and its asking price influence buyers’ propensity to participate in spe-
cific auctions. However, if fishers are successful in attracting more than 
one buyer to participate in the auction, it implies competition and 
improved chances of clearing the market at or above fishers’ price ex-
pectations. This is indicated by a limited number of studies which find 
that prices increase, or decrease in the case of contract bidding, with 
increasing numbers of bidders (e.g., MacDonald et al., 2002; Porter and 
Zona, 1999). 
However, findings regarding the price effect of each additional 
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bidder differ substantially between studies. For example, Meyer (1988), 
who studied Texas rice auctions, detected a price increase of 4.6 % for 
each additional bidder. Wilson and Diersen (2001), who studied bidding 
for Egyptian import tenders for different vegetable oils, found that the 
price declined by only 0.6 % when a second bidder entered the auction 
and that the effect of additional bidders was less than that of a second 
bidder, indicating nonlinearity. 
To the best of our knowledge, bidder numbers and their importance 
for competition and hence resource utilization have not been addressed 
in previous research on fish auctions. This study seeks to fill some of this 
void in the literature. More specifically, we investigate what determines 
the number of bidders in the auction for frozen Atlantic cod in Northern 
Norway and examine to what extent bidder participation is influenced 
by factors such as quality grade, lot size, starting prices, fishing methods, 
and seasonality. We also estimate the effect of each additional bidder on 
final prices while controlling for the same factors as well as heteroge-
neity among sellers, buyers, and seller–buyer relationships, which may 
affect prices (Gobillon et al., 2017). 
The study analyzes a unique data set based on the bid log from the 
auction covering the period from 2009 to 2018, which included 9831 
auctions and almost 150,000 tons of cod at a value of NOK 3.409 billion. 
The auction is a web-based ascending or English type of auction with 
low barriers of entry for potential buyers. The Atlantic cod is mainly sold 
by oceangoing vessels fishing with bottom trawl, longlines, or Danish 
seines. Different types of buyers participate in the auction. Some buy the 
frozen fish to produce saltfish or clipfish, and some produce fillets for a 
variety of different consumer markets. In addition, some buyers are 
agents buying the fish for processors located abroad. 
2. Material and methods 
2.1. The auction 
The ex-vessel sale of wild-caught fish in Norway is legally protected 
through the Raw Fish Act and is organized by sales organizations, owned 
by fishers, with the exclusive right to coordinate the primary sale of fish. 
There are several different sales organizations that cover different 
geographical regions for groundfish, and one sales organization that 
coordinates the sale of pelagic fish such as mackerel and herring. This 
study focuses on frozen headed and gutted Atlantic cod auctioned by the 
Norwegian Fishermen’s Sales Organization (NFSO), the largest sales 
organization for groundfish in Norway, which records all transactions 
and provided the data for this study.1 The NFSO has exclusive rights to 
all ex-vessel sales of groundfish landed along the Norwegian coast from 
Nordmøre in the southwest to Finnmark in the northeast. 
The cod is mainly captured by large oceangoing bottom trawlers, 
longliners, or Danish seiners. All trawlers and oceangoing longliners 
have on-board freezing facilities, as do some of the Danish seiners. The 
fish are mainly headed and gutted and frozen in 20-kilogram boxes at 
sea. The fishing vessel lands the cod at one of several independent cold 
storage plants (Bendiksen and Dreyer, 2002). In the NFSO’s district 
there are 14 independent cold storage plants, from which lots are 
shipped by cargo vessels to customers worldwide. At the cold storage 
plants, the weights of catches are controlled as part of the Norwegian 
resource control in order to make sure that fishing quotas are not 
exceeded. The fisher pays a storage fee, and the fish can be stored for 
several months if the fisher, for instance, anticipates future price in-
creases. At the same time, longer storage time may lead to quality 
degradation (Badii and Howel, 2002), which in turn may influence 
prices negatively. 
The auction is conducted online on the NFSO’s auction website, 
implying that physical inspection of the fish is not possible at the time of 
bidding. However, buyers may complain if the lot does not correspond 
with the information provided at the auction (e.g., if the size of fish is 
incorrect, or the quality is below expectations). The fish are auctioned in 
lots that may consist of one or several fish species of different sizes and 
quantities. The lot is sold in price (NOK) per kilogram even though it 
may consist of different species that are valued differently. Thus, buyers 
must assess how much they might be willing to pay for the whole lot. In 
order to avoid unnecessary variation, this study includes lots with 
Atlantic cod only. 
The auctioneer puts out lots on the auction website with a fixed 
closing time, for example 12:10 PM the next day, with one lot auctioned 
every five minutes. The auction is an ascending or English type of auc-
tion where the bidder that has the highest bid at the closing time wins. 
The auction website is open for registered buyers and sellers. Buyer 
entry is easy.2 Bids can only be placed by Norwegian companies, but 
several foreign buyers have registered Norwegian shell companies so 
they can participate at the auction. 
On the NFSO’s auction website, all participants can see details of the 
lot as well as the starting price and the highest current bid. The identity 
of bidders is not revealed, preventing the presence of strong buyers 
negatively influencing the participation and bidding behavior of weaker 
buyers (Klemperer, 2002). In addition, the number of participating 
bidders is not revealed, only the highest bid. To entice buyer partici-
pation, the auctioneer3 makes daily phone calls to likely buyers to 
apprise them of upcoming auctions that might be of interest. 
For each specific auction, information is provided regarding the lot, 
such as the name of the vessel, fishing method used, the time and 
location of landing, if the fish is downgraded or not, and the product 
form. The seller may provide a reserve price for the package in NOK4 per 
kilogram, but this is not binding, as about one third of the transactions 
included in this study were sold at a price below the seller’s reserve 
price. In addition, the seller sets a starting price, usually based on dis-
cussions with the auctioneer, reflecting auction prices gained for similar 
products during the last week. 
Buyers may place their bids in two ways: manual bids or automatic 
bidding. Manual bids imply that buyers push virtual buttons on the 
website with predefined price jumps of NOK 0.05, 0.10, 0.20, 0.50, or 1, 
until the intended bid price is found, before pressing a confirmation 
button confirming the bid. With automatic bidding, buyers use the same 
price buttons as for manual bids until the maximum price they are 
willing to pay is reached. The maximum price can be seen only by the 
auctioneer. When the buyer confirms his or her maximum bid price, the 
system will first place a bid equal to the start price. If a rival places a 
higher bid, the system will raise bids by NOK 0.05, which is the fixed 
price jump for all automatic bids, and follow up with new bids of NOK 
0.05 should a competitor raise his or her price any further. This will 
continue until the closing time and the lot is won, or until a buyer’s 
stated maximum price is reached and the lot is won by a rival. The 
predefined bid jumps of NOK 0.05 have the advantage that price 
1 The Sunnmøre and Romsdal Fishermen’s Sales Organization (SUROFI) is the 
second largest sales organization for groundfish in Norway and has exclusive 
rights to all ex-vessel sales of groundfish in the Sunnmøre and Romsdal districts. 
As for the NFSO, fishers selling their catches through SUROFI can choose if they 
want to sell directly or through an auction. Interestingly, many fishers and 
buyers participate in both the NFSO and SUROFI auctions. 
2 In order to participate in the auction, buyers must apply to the Directorate 
of Fisheries to become a registered buyer. The application must contain docu-
mentation that the company (buyer) is a publicly registered company and that a 
service fee has been paid. In addition, the applicant must document that he or 
she has access (by owning, renting, or cooperation) to a plant that adheres to 
the regulations for quality control of seafood. Finally, the applicant must act in 
accordance with the regulations set by the relevant sales organization(s), 
including a bank guarantee.  
3 The NFSO has five persons acting as auctioneers with responsibility for 
different groundfish species.  
4 The average exchange rate for 2017 was NOK 1 = USD 0.1209/EUR 0.1071. 
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signaling between buyers is difficult (Klemperer, 2002). According to 
the auctioneer, it is common that buyers place their bid at the last op-
portunity before the fixed closing time, referred to as “sniping” in the 
literature (Ely and Hossain, 2009; Roth and Ockenfels, 2002). However, 
if a bid is placed less than 20 s before the closing time, the auction is 
extended by 20 s. 
2.2. Data and descriptive statistics 
The data include details of 9831 auctions of frozen headed and gutted 
Atlantic cod held during the time period June 2, 2010–December 31, 
2018, which includes 148,746 tons of Atlantic cod with an ex-vessel value 
of NOK 3.409 billion (USD 412 million). For each auction, the data include 
the weight of the package in kilograms, the fishing gear (bottom trawl, 
longline, Danish seine, or other gear), the average size of the fish in ki-
lograms, its quality (regular or downgraded), the name of the vessel and 
buyer, the start price and winning price, the date of landing, the date of 
the auction, and the number of participating bidders. Table 1 shows 
descriptive statistics for the variables included in the econometric models. 
Table 1 shows that winning prices average slightly higher (NOK 23.48) 
than starting prices (NOK 22.43) but with similar standard deviations. The 
average daily quantity was about 147 tons. The average quantity for each 
auction was about 15 tons, with substantial variation, as indicated by the 
high standard deviation. The average fish size was 3.52 kilograms, varying 
between 0.8 and 17 kilograms.. The average storage time was 12 days, and 
the maximum storage time was 432 days. Table 1 also shows a dummy 
variable for regular quality with downgraded fish as the base and 
dummies for the three main fishing methods, with other fishing methods5 
as a base. The reported mean for each dummy variable is the number of 
observations within each category as a proportion of the total number of 
observations. For example, bottom trawl accounted for 55 % of auctions 
during the sample period, and the three primary fishing methods 
accounted for 97 % of all fishing methods in the auction. 
Table 2 presents the number of auctions categorized by the number of 
bidders for each of the nine years represented in the data set. The table re-
veals several interesting aspects of the auction. For example, for the whole 
period, the average number of bidders in each auction was only 2.46. The 
low average number of bidders indicates that competition is not very strong. 
It is also interesting that there were 2341 auctions, representing 23.8 % of all 
auctions, with one bidder only, implying no competition. It can also be seen 
that few auctions had five or more bidders (less than 6% of all auctions). 
Table 2 also shows that the average number of bidders per auction was 
higher in 2010 and 2011 than in the succeeding years. This may be 
explained by more interest from buyers due to lower fishing quotas for cod 
in 2010 (about 283,000 tons) and 2011 (about 337,000 tons) compared to 
the 2012–2018 period, which averaged about 414,000 tons per year. 
It has been argued convincingly in the auction literature and shown 
empirically that a low starting price will attract more bidders and increase 
prices (Ku et al., 2006). Table 3 presents the average starting and winning 
prices in auctions categorized by the number of bidders. Table 3 indicates 
a negative relationship between the number of participating bidders and 
starting prices; that is, the lower the starting prices are, the more bidders 
participate. There also seems to be a positive relationship between the 
number of bidders and winning prices. Even though auctions with only 
one bidder have the highest average starting price (NOK 22.73), these 
auctions have the lowest average winning prices (NOK 22.75). Inspection 
of Table 3 also shows that the gap between starting and winning prices 
increases with the number of bidders, except for auctions with seven 
bidders. The econometric models outlined below will explore whether 
starting prices influence bidder numbers, while controlling for the influ-
ence of other variables. 
2.3. Econometric modeling 
To examine the influence of various factors on the number of bidders, 
we use a binary logit model, and to estimate the anticipated effect of 
each additional bidder on price, a hedonic price modeling is used. 
2.3.1. Binary logit model 
For the binary logit model, we first estimate the effect of different vari-
ables on the probability of more than one bidder. The dummy variable Bidders 
equals 1 for auctions with more than one bidder, and zero for auctions with 





if Bidder∗i > 0
if Bidder∗i ≤ 0
(1)  
Pr(Bidderi = 1|X) = φ(Zi) (2)  
where Bidder∗ is a latent, unobserved variable. For example, the differ-
ence between the starting price and bidders’ valuation of a lot may 
determine whether they choose to participate in an auction or not. 
Bidderi equals 1 when Bidder∗i > 0. For Eq. (2), Pr(Bidderi = 1) condi-
tional on the explanatory variable X is a logistical distribution function, 
with a range between 0 and 1. The specification of Zi, which is the 
logarithm odds ratio between the probabilities of two or more bidders 
and one bidder, is in the form: 








where i represents the number of transactions, and Starting-Price is the 
price fishers set as a minimum asking price. Year and Month are dummy 
variables with the first year (2010) and December as the base, respec-
tively. The error term, Residual, captures other unobserved factors that 
might affect bidder participation. 
We modify the basic logit model (Model 1) by adding the charac-
teristics of the fish, transaction quantity, and daily sales quantity for 
Model 2 and by further adding the seller dummies for Model 3. 




+ c2log(Transaction Quantityi) + d1log(Fish Sizei)
+ e1Qualityi + e2log(Storage Timei) + f1Bottom Trawli + f2Autolinei









Descriptive statistics for the variables included in the study.  
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Winning-Price (NOK) 23.48 6.30 5.36 43.04 
Starting-Price (NOK) 22.43 6.28 5.31 38.31 
Daily-Quantity (kilograms) 147,036 137,192 23 779,351 
Transaction-Quant. (kilograms) 15,130 26,369 6 353,157 
Fish-Size (kilograms) 3.52 2.29 0.8 17 
Storage-Time (days) 12.02 19.22 1 432 
log (Winning-Price) 3.12 0.29 1.68 3.76 
log (Starting-Price) 3.05 0.33 1.61 3.68 
log (Daily-Quantity) 11.37 1.21 3.14 13.57 
log (Transaction-Quantity) 8.23 1.96 1.79 12.77 
log (Fish-Size) 1.02 0.73 − 0.22 2.83 
log (Storage-Time) 2.09 0.76 0 6.07 
Quality 0.90 0.31 0 1 
Bottom-Trawl 0.55 0.50 0 1 
Longline 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Danish-Seine 0.13 0.33 0 1  
5 Several other fishing methods were used, such as traps and pots. These are 
treated as one group and used as a base category for comparisons with bottom 
trawl, longline, and Danish seine. 
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+ c2log(Transaction Quantityi) + d1log(Fish Sizei)
+ e1Qualityi + e2log(Storage Timei) + f1Bottom Trawli + f2Autolinei



















The estimation from the logit model is the logarithmic odds ratio be-
tween the probabilities of more than one bidder and one bidder. We follow 
the common practices in the literature and compute the marginal effect of 
the determinants. The marginal effect directly demonstrates the change in 
the probability of more than one bidder when the covariate increases by 
one unit (from 0 to 1 for dummy variables), ceteris paribus. 
In order to test the monotonic pattern between the starting price and 
number of bidders, we further apply the binary logit model to the 
dependent variable, number of Bidders = 2 against 1, 3 against 2, 4 against 
3, and 5 plus against 4. Finally, an ordered logit regression is applied to the 
ordinal dependent variable (Bidders = 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 plus). 
2.3.2. The price model 
The basic model includes the dummies for the number of bidders, and 
the dummies for years and months, which captures any effects seasonality 
might have on prices. This leads to the following specification of Model 4: 
log(Pricei) = a0 + b1Bidders− 2i + b2Bidders− 3i + b3Bidders− 4i








where i represents the number of transactions and log is the logarithm 
function, and Pricei is the winning price. All the price variables are 
deflated by the Norwegian consumer price index for food. With the 
auctions with only one bidder as the base, Bidders-2 is a dummy for 
auctions with two bidders, Bidders-3 for three bidders, Bidders-4 for four 
bidders, and Bidder-5plus for five or more bidders. The error term, Re-
sidual, captures other unobserved factors that might affect prices. 
Besides the number of bidders, the price of an individual lot of 
Atlantic cod may also depend on its quality characteristics, such as the 
average size of the fish, whether the fish were downgraded or not, the 
storage time, and the fishing method used. The size of each individual lot 
(transaction quantity) and the daily sales quantity at the auction may 
also influence prices.6 Thus, Eq. (6) (for Model 4) is modified in Model 5: 
log(Pricei) = a0 + b1Bidders− 2i + b2Bidders− 3i + b3Bidders− 4i




+ c2log(Transaction Quantityi) + d1log(Fish Sizei)
+ e1Qualityi + e2log(Storage Timei) + f1Bottom Trawli







moMontho + Residuali (7)  
where Daily-Quantity is the daily traded quantity; Transaction-Quantity is 
the quantity of each lot; Fish-Size is the average size of the fish; Quality is 
a dummy for cod with regular quality, with downgraded fish as the base; 
and Storage-Time is the average storage time of a lot. The three main 
fishing methods (Bottom-Trawl, Longline, and Danish-Seine) are dummies, 
with the other fishing methods as the base. 
Since fish prices are probably affected by auction market imperfec-
tions due to heterogenous sellers, heterogenous buyers, and seller–buyer 
relationships (Gobillon et al., 2017), we modify Eq. (7) by including 
dummies for the 50 largest sellers (by total quantity sold), the 50 largest 
buyers (by total quantity purchased), and the largest 99 seller–buyer 
pairs in terms of traded quantity. This yields Model 6: 
log(Pricei) = a0 + b1Bidders− 2i + b2Bidders− 3i + b3Bidders− 4i




+ c2log(Transaction Quantityi) + d1log(Fish Sizei)
+ e1Qualityi + e2log(Storage Timei) + f1Bottom Trawli

















soSellerBuyero + Residuali (8) 
Models 4, 5, and 6 assume constant impacts of the number of bidders 
on the winning price. The impacts of the number of bidders may vary 
over time. Accordingly, following Kristofersson and Rickertsen (2004) 
Table 2 
The number of auctions categorized by the number of bidders.  
Bidder number 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Sum 
1 11 20 234 230 310 356 485 358 337 2341 
2 49 184 263 515 404 462 448 413 445 3183 
3 156 313 211 333 362 271 290 299 260 2495 
4 119 226 93 158 181 140 116 106 99 1238 
5 72 56 30 37 102 30 35 31 20 413 
6 23 26 6 20 22 7 3 10 4 121 
7 7 3 4 4 12 1 1 0 6 38 
8 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Sum (Deals) 437 828 841 1,297 1,395 1,267 1,378 1,217 1,171 9,831 
Total Active bidders 1,600 2,688 1,979 3,224 3,670 2,852 2,915 2,720 2,569 24,217 
Total transaction quantity (tons) 6363 12794 12545 24825 22945 17651 20394 15968 15260 148746 
Total active bidders / Deals 3.66 3.25 2.35 2.49 2.63 2.25 2.12 2.24 2.19 2.46  
Table 3 
Starting and winning prices in auctions by the number of bidders.  
Bidder number Starting-Price Winning-Price Gap 
1 22.73 22.75 0.02 
2 22.50 23.36 0.86 
3 22.53 24.03 1.51 
4 21.89 23.85 1.96 
5 21.68 24.15 2.47 
6 21.24 23.76 2.52 
7 21.15 23.29 2.14 
8 21.96 25.03 3.06  
6 In the literature, the hedonic price model is applied to explore the impact of 
fish characteristics and other determinants on fish price (Asche et al., 2015; 
Roheim et al., 2011 et al., 2011; Sogn-Grundvåg et al., 2013, 2014, 2019, 
2020). The preliminary estimation results indicate a positive impact of starting 
price on the final price. This is probably due to multicollinearity between 
starting price and bidder numbers. Thus, the price model excludes the starting 
price to avoid multicollinearity and over-specification. 
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and Hammarlund (2015), we estimate a multilevel hedonic price model 
with a particular focus on the dynamic coefficients of bidder numbers in 
Models 4, 5, and 6. 
3. Results 
3.1. Binary logit model 
Table 4 presents the estimation results of the logit models. The  
McFadden (1973) pseudo-R2 value is 0.0352 for Model 1, 0.0584 for 
Model 2, and 0.096 for Model 3, indicating that Model 3 has better 
goodness of fit than the other two models.7 We further use the log like-
lihood ratio to test Model 1 against Model 2, and Model 2 against Model 3. 
For each test, the model with fewer variables is nested under the other 
model. The results show that Model 3 fits the data better than the other 
two models. Accordingly, we focus on the estimation results of Model 3. 
For the starting price, the estimate is 0.1835, which implies that a 0.1 
unit increase in log (Starting-Price), corresponding to 11 % of the mean 
starting price, increases the probability of two or more bidders by 1.84 %. 
This rather marginal effect of starting price on the probability of two or 
more bidders is reasonable given the small differences between starting 
prices in auctions with different numbers of bidders. Table 2 shows that the 
difference in average starting prices between auctions with two and three 
bidders—which account for 57.8 % of all auctions—is only NOK 0.032. 
For the other numeric variables, the coefficients are significant. A one- 
unit rise in log (Daily-Quantity) results in a 1.44 % higher probability of 
two or more bidders. For log (Transaction Quantity) and log (Fish-Size), a one- 
unit rise leads to 1.68 % and 1.57 % higher probabilities of two or more 
bidders, respectively. However, these estimates are all rather small. The log 
(Storage-Time) is negative and significant. A one-unit increase in log (Stor-
age-Time) results in a 4.22 % lower probability of two or more bidders. 
The estimate for the dummy for Quality is -0.0532, indicating that cod 
of downgraded quality has a 5.32 % higher probability of two or more 
bidders than cod of regular quality does. That fish of lower quality attracts 
more bidders than fish of regular quality may seem counterintuitive. 
However, it is in accordance with the perception of the auctioneers, who 
believe that some of the downgraded fish may have faults that are less 
important to some buyers, which may hope to make a bargain. 
The dummies for Bottom-Trawl and Longline are significant and pos-
itive, indicating that the probability of two or more bidders is 11.35 % 
higher for cod caught by bottom trawl and 8.78 % higher for cod caught 
with longline, compared with other fishing methods (the base) and 
Danish seine, which is not significant, indicating no difference from the 
base. 
All the yearly dummies, except for the dummy for 2011, are sig-
nificant and negative compared to the base (2010). This indicates that 
2010 and 2011 have the same probability of two or more bidders, 
which is higher than the probability for the other seven years from 
2012 to 2018. This is probably explained by lower fishing quotas and 
thus a more competitive market in 2010 and 2011 than in the subse-
quent years.8 All the monthly dummies are significant and positive, 
indicating that compared to the base (December), buyers are more 
active in the other months, with probabilities for two or more bidders 
higher than December and ranging between 4.58 % (November) and 
11.54 % (May). 
We further estimated Model 3 with pairwise bidder numbers. The 
estimated coefficients for the starting price are reported in Table 5 (the 
complete results are available upon request). Compared to Bidders = 1, 
an increase in the starting price would increase the probability of 
Bidders = 2. Although the starting price does not affect Bidders = 3 
versus Bidders = 2 and Bidders = 5+ versus Bidders = 4, an increase in 
Table 4 
Estimation of marginal effects of the logit models.  
Variable Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
log (Starting-Price) 0.2377 *** 0.1308 *** 0.1835 ***  
[0.0215]  [0.0354]  [0.0355]  
log (Daily-Quantity)   0.0162 *** 0.0144 ***    
[0.0035]  [0.0035]  
log (Transaction- 
Quantity)   
0.0186 *** 0.0168 ***    
[0.0022]  [0.0022]  
log (Fish-Size)   0.0153 ** 0.0157 ***    
[0.0061]  [0.0059]  
Quality   − 0.0458 *** − 0.0532 ***    
[0.0150]  [0.0142]  
log (Storage-Time)   − 0.0358 *** − 0.0422 ***    
[0.0054]  [0.0055]  
Bottom-Trawl   − 0.0072  0.1135 ***    
[0.0217]  [0.0317]  
Longline   0.0484 ** 0.0878 ***    
[0.0208]  [0.0241]  
Danish-Seine   − 0.0054  0.0266     
[0.0238]  [0.0272]  
Year-2011 − 0.0264  − 0.0153  − 0.0164   
[0.0660]  [0.0630]  [0.0607]  
Year-2012 − 0.6008 *** − 0.5778 *** − 0.5995 ***  
[0.0554]  [0.0592]  [0.0584]  
Year-2013 − 0.3804 *** − 0.4322 *** − 0.4251 ***  
[0.0729]  [0.0720]  [0.0732]  
Year-2014 − 0.5088 *** − 0.5237 *** − 0.5299 ***  
[0.0652]  [0.0645]  [0.0653]  
Year-2015 − 0.6583 *** − 0.6349 *** − 0.6527 ***  
[0.0485]  [0.0534]  [0.0529]  
Year-2016 − 0.7233 *** − 0.7075 *** − 0.7056 ***  
[0.0389]  [0.0431]  [0.0456]  
Year-2017 − 0.7095 *** − 0.6858 *** − 0.6977 ***  
[0.0407]  [0.0469]  [0.0474]  
Year-2018 − 0.735 *** − 0.6979 *** − 0.7372 ***  
[0.0366]  [0.0467]  [0.0422]  
January 0.0987 *** 0.0949 *** 0.1101 ***  
[0.0120]  [0.0122]  [0.0105]  
February 0.0554 *** 0.0501 *** 0.0759 ***  
[0.0160]  [0.0164]  [0.0139]  
March 0.083 *** 0.089 *** 0.1009 ***  
[0.0147]  [0.0142]  [0.0123]  
April 0.0911 *** 0.1003 *** 0.1086 ***  
[0.0141]  [0.0131]  [0.0114]  
May 0.0893 *** 0.1048 *** 0.1154 ***  
[0.0136]  [0.0122]  [0.0105]  
June 0.0426 *** 0.0671 *** 0.0826 ***  
[0.0155]  [0.0140]  [0.0123]  
July 0.0397 ** 0.074 *** 0.0855 ***  
[0.0164]  [0.0141]  [0.0125]  
August 0.0528 *** 0.0794 *** 0.0923 ***  
[0.0159]  [0.0140]  [0.0123]  
September 0.0305 ** 0.0674 *** 0.0768 ***  
[0.0162]  [0.0140]  [0.0128]  
October 0.0745 *** 0.0845 *** 0.0903 ***  
[0.0129]  [0.0123]  [0.0114]  
November 0.027 * 0.0349 ** 0.0458 ***  
[0.0151]  [0.0147]  [0.0137]  
With seller, buyer, and 
seller-buyer dummies 
No  No  Yes  
McFadden’s pseudo-R 
squared 
0.0352  0.0584  0.096  
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, 
respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
7 The McFadden (1973) Pseudo R2 is generally much lower than R2 in the 
OLS models, since the continuous dependent variable in profit/logit models is 
unobserved (Veall and Zimmerman, 1996; Dedman et al., 2014).  
8 The Norwegian cod quota was 217,000 and 319,000 tons in 2010 and 2011, 
respectively. The average quota for the 2012–2018 period was 405,550 tons. 
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the starting price would raise the number of bidders from three to 
four.9 
3.2. The price model 
Tables 6 presents the econometric results for Models 4, 5, and 6. The 
Newey–West covariance matrix is applied to correct for hetero-
skedasticity and serial correlation in the error terms. As shown in  
Table 6, the adjusted R2 is 0.662 for Model 4, 0.847 for Model 5, and 
0.867 for Model 6. The models with more variables have a larger 
adjusted R2 than the models with fewer variables, indicating that the 
additional variables improve the goodness of fit. The results of an F-test 
indicate that Model 4 is rejected against Model 5, and Model 5 is rejected 
against Model 6. Thus, Model 6 fits the data better than the other two 
models. Consequently, we focus on the estimation results of Model 6. 
As shown in Table 6, the four dummies representing different 
numbers of bidders are all significant at the 1% level. As the dependent 
variable is in the logarithmic scale, the estimates of dummy variables are 
percentages, compared to the base. Thus, compared to auctions with 
only one bidder, auctions with two bidders gain a 4.51 % higher price. 
Auctions with three, four, and five plus bidders gain premiums of 6.47 
%, 7.18 %, and 9.88 %, respectively, compared with auctions with only 
one bidder, holding other variables constant. The relationship between 
bidder numbers and price is illustrated in Fig. 1. 
The estimates of the numeric variables are explained as elasticity, 
since they (and the dependent variable) are in the logarithmic scale. For 
a one-percentage-point increase, daily quantity raises the final price by 
0.36 % and a one-percentage-point increase in fish size raises the final 
price by 7.37 %. Transaction quantity does not affect the final price. The 
log (Storage-Time) is significant and negative, indicating that a one-unit 
increase in log (Storage-Time), implying reduced quality, leads to a 2.11 
% reduction in price, holding other factors constant. 
For the dummies for fishing methods, Bottom-Trawl is insignificant, 
Longline is significant and positive, and Danish-Seine is significant and 
negative. Holding other factors constant, cod caught by bottom trawl 
has the same price as cod caught by other fishing methods (the base), 
cod caught by longline gains a 7.66 % price premium, and cod caught by 
Danish seine has a 3.56 % discount. 
All yearly dummies are significant. Compared to 2010 as the base, 
cod in 2012, 2013, and 2014 were 10.53 %, 36.8 %, and 18.9 % cheaper, 
respectively. For the subsequent years, the price was higher than the 
base. These yearly price variations probably reflect large variations in 
the yearly Norwegian cod catches. The monthly dummies with the 
exception of November are significant, with values ranging between 
2.09 % (October) and -10.02 % (February). 
Table 7 presents the results of the multilevel regressions for Models 
4, 5, and 6. We mainly focus on the dynamic pattern of the coefficients of 
bidder numbers, since the regressions with all dynamic coefficients are 
not convergent. For each of the new regressions, although the 
Table 5 
Estimated Marginal Effects log (Starting-Price) from the Logit Model for Pairwise 
Bidder Numbers.  
Model Estimate  
Bidders = 2 versus Bidders = 1 0.2763 *** 
Bidders = 3 versus Bidders = 2 − 0.0178  
Bidders = 4 versus Bidders = 3 − 0.2171 *** 
Bidders = 5+ versus Bidders = 4 0.0775  
Notes: *** indicates significant at the 0.01 level. 
Table 6 
Estimation of the price model using OLS approach.      
Variable Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  
Intercept 3.1027 *** 2.7457 *** 2.7148 ***  
[0.0109]  [0.0177]  [0.0182]  
Bidders-2 0.0685 *** 0.0501 *** 0.0451 ***  
[0.0051]  [0.0032]  [0.0032]  
Bidders-3 0.114 *** 0.0673 *** 0.0647 ***  
[0.0052]  [0.0034]  [0.0034]  
Bidders-4 0.1208 *** 0.0691 *** 0.0718 ***  
[0.0059]  [0.004]  [0.004]  
Bidders-5+ 0.1565 *** 0.0981 *** 0.0988 ***  
[0.0075]  [0.0057]  [0.0056]  
log (Daily-Quantity)   0.0038 *** 0.00360 ***    
[0.0013]  [0.0012]  
log (Transaction- 
Quantity)   
− 0.0013 * − 0.0006     
[0.0007]  [0.0006]  
log (Fish-Size)   0.0882 *** 0.0737 ***    
[0.0017]  [0.0021]  
Quality   0.2862 *** 0.3063 ***    
[0.0056]  [0.0059]  
log (Storage-Time)   − 0.0195 *** − 0.0211 ***    
[0.0019]  [0.0018]  
Bottom-Trawl   0.0241 *** 0.0139 *    
[0.0049]  [0.0081]  
Longline   0.0874 *** 0.0766 ***    
[0.0051]  [0.0075]  
Danish-Seine   − 0.0241 *** − 0.0355 ***    
[0.0057]  [0.0085]  
Year-2011 0.0379 *** 0.021 *** 0.0206 ***  
[0.0103]  [0.0078]  [0.0072]  
Year-2012 − 0.1071 *** − 0.1192 *** − 0.1053 ***  
[0.0119]  [0.0094]  [0.0088]  
Year-2013 − 0.3829 *** − 0.3847 *** − 0.3684 ***  
[0.0095]  [0.0073]  [0.007]  
Year-2014 − 0.2092 *** − 0.2013 *** − 0.1886 ***  
[0.0101]  [0.0078]  [0.0076]  
Year-2015 0.0761 *** 0.0667 *** 0.0711 ***  
[0.0095]  [0.0072]  [0.0071]  
Year-2016 0.1384 *** 0.1114 *** 0.1071 ***  
[0.0094]  [0.0073]  [0.0072]  
Year-2017 0.2239 *** 0.1979 *** 0.1968 ***  
[0.0096]  [0.0071]  [0.0072]  
Year-2018 0.3803 *** 0.351 *** 0.338 ***         
[0.0093]  [0.0074]  [0.0074]  
January − 0.0889 *** − 0.0914 *** − 0.0811 ***  
[0.0081]  [0.0056]  [0.0054]  
February − 0.115 *** − 0.109 *** − 0.1002 ***  
[0.01]  [0.0067]  [0.0063]  
March − 0.1317 *** − 0.111 *** − 0.1004 ***  
[0.0097]  [0.0069]  [0.0067]  
April − 0.1442 *** − 0.0947 *** − 0.0908 ***  
[0.0092]  [0.0063]  [0.0064]  
May − 0.1281 *** − 0.079 *** − 0.0718 ***  
[0.0089]  [0.0061]  [0.0061]  
June − 0.1214 *** − 0.0686 *** − 0.0634 ***  
[0.0084]  [0.0061]  [0.0057]  
July − 0.1636 *** − 0.0979 *** − 0.091 ***  
[0.0088]  [0.006]  [0.0059]  
August − 0.1479 *** − 0.0607 *** − 0.0594 ***  
[0.0085]  [0.006]  [0.0058]  
September − 0.0675 *** − 0.0363 *** − 0.0307 ***  
[0.0078]  [0.0054]  [0.0053]  
October − 0.0369 *** − 0.0218 *** − 0.0209 ***  
[0.0076]  [0.0052]  [0.0049]  
November 0.0175 ** 0.0055  0.0074   
[0.0076]  [0.0052]  [0.005]  
With seller, buyer, and 
seller–buyer 
dummies 
No  No  Yes  
Adj.R2 0.6623  0.847  0.8669  
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, 
respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
9 We further estimated a partial parallel ordered model for bidder numbers =
1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 plus. The estimation results (see Appendix 2) indicate that the 
odds ratios between the probabilities of more bidders and fewer bidders are less 
than 1. 
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coefficients are slightly different from their counterparts in the OLS 
regressions, all the coefficients of the bidder numbers are significant, 
and with a monotonic increasing pattern, in line with the findings from 
the OLS regressions. 
4. Discussion 
This study contributes to the literature on fish auctions by examining 
empirically the antecedents and consequences of the number of 
participating bidders in an ex-vessel auction for frozen Atlantic cod. The 
results clearly demonstrate that bidder participation has a substantial 
effect on prices. For example, compared to auctions with only one 
bidder, auctions with two bidders gain 4.51 % higher prices, holding 
other variables constant. With five or more bidders, prices increase by 
9.88 % compared to auctions with one bidder only. With an increasing 
number of bidders, competition increases, and prices should reflect the 
quality and quantity of catches and incentivize fishers to provide high- 
quality fish of importance for optimal use of the valuable Atlantic cod 
stock. Competition also means that winning bids will be provided by the 
buyers that, over time, are the most capable of adding value and earning 
profits, which also contributes to optimal resource use. 
At the same time, however, it is somewhat puzzling that almost 24 % 
of the studied auctions were completed with only one bidder, implying 
no competition whatsoever, and also that the average number of bidders 
was only 2.46. This should be a concern for both fishers and policy 
makers aiming to optimize the use of the Atlantic cod stock. In order to 
address this concern, the NFSO should consider mandatory auctions. 
Integrating the NFSO and SUROFI auctions, in which many of the same 
fishers and buyers participate, may also lead to enhanced competition, 
as indicated by Guillotreau and Jiménez-Toribio (2011), showing that 
integrating French fish auctions led to increased ex-vessel prices. 
Our findings regarding factors influencing bidder participation are 
also of relevance and should be considered carefully by fishers who want 
to attract more bidders and obtain better prices. For example, the results 
indicate that larger lots and cod of larger size increase the probability of 
two or more buyers and lead to higher prices. Also, longer storage time 
reduces the probability of two or more bidders and leads to lower prices, 
indicating that longer storage time makes the fish less attractive to 
buyers. In addition, the probability of two or more bidders varies over 
the year, with May being the month with the highest probability of two 
or more bidders. At the same time, however, fish auctioned in the fall 
(September, October, and December) gain better prices than in other 
months of the year, and in particular the winter months of February, 
March, and April. This probably reflects the large landings of fresh cod 
from the coastal fleet during the winter months, given that the ex-vessel 
markets for fresh and frozen cod in Norway have been found to be in-
tegrated (Helstad et al., 2015; Pettersen et al., 2018). 
An interesting finding is that cod caught with bottom trawl has a 
higher probability of two or more bidders than fish caught with longline. 
This may seem surprising given that cod caught with longline has been 
found to be of better quality than trawl-caught cod (Rotabakk et al., 
2011). However, line-caught cod is also more expensive than 
trawl-caught cod. Thus, the less expensive fish may be preferred by 
buyers making end products of medium quality such as breaded fish 
fingers. That fishing methods influence prices differently, indicating 
quality differences, is in line with previous studies of ex-vessel fish 
markets (e.g., Asche et al., 2015; Hammarlund, 2015; Lee, 2014; 
McConnell and Strand, 2000; Sogn-Grundvåg et al., 2020). A price 
premium for line-caught cod compared to cod caught with other fishing 
methods has also been found at the retail level of the supply chain 
(Sogn-Grundvåg et al., 2013, 2014). 
Although this study is conducted in a specific context, the results and 
implications should be of relevance for other fish auctions, as they 
contribute to improved understanding of antecedents and consequences 
of bidder numbers and competition in fish auctions, which is important 
to optimize the utilization of limited marine resources. 
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Fig. 1. Relationship between bidder numbers and prices.  
Table 7 
Estimation of the price model with dynamic coefficient of dummies for bidder 
numbers.  
Variable Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  
Intercept 3.0405 *** 2.6725 *** 2.6631 ***  
[0.0268]  [0.0272]  [0.0268]  
Bidders-2 0.0582 *** 0.0389 *** 0.0338 ***  
[0.011]  [0.0061]  [0.0054]  
Bidders-3 0.0984 *** 0.0528 *** 0.05 ***  
[0.011]  [0.0071]  [0.0063]  
Bidders-4 0.1013 *** 0.05 *** 0.0502 ***  
[0.0121]  [0.0079]  [0.0065]  
Bidders-5+ 0.1127 *** 0.0529 *** 0.0547 ***  
[0.013]  [0.0089]  [0.0081]  
log (Daily-Quantity)   0.0027 *** 0.0024 ***    
[0.0009]  [0.0009]  
log (Transaction- 
Quantity)   
0.0000  0.0002     
[0.0005]  [0.0005]  
log (Fish-Size)   0.0895 *** 0.0778 ***    
[0.0013]  [0.0016]  
Quality   0.2844 *** 0.2927 ***    
[0.0035]  [0.0038]  
log (Storage-Time)   − 0.0066 *** − 0.0078     
[0.0014]  [0.0013]  
Bottom-Trawl   0.0211 *** 0.0114     
[0.0054]  [0.007]  
Longline   0.095 *** 0.0861 ***    
[0.0055]  [0.0068]  
Danish-Seine   − 0.0209 *** − 0.03 ***    
[0.0058]  [0.0073]  
With seller, buyer, and 
seller-buyer dummies 
No  No   Yes 
Chi-Square 12172 *** 18646 *** 15854 *** 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, 
respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Appendix 1 Transaction shares for top sellers, buyers, and seller–buyer pairs  
Top Seller Buyer Seller-Buyer 
1 4.71 % 10.79 % 0.65 % 
2 3.71 % 10.74 % 0.61 % 
3 3.50 % 5.69 % 0.56 % 
4 3.18 % 5.08 % 0.48 % 
5 2.90 % 4.25 % 0.48 % 
6 2.85 % 4.08 % 0.47 % 
7 2.63 % 4.07 % 0.40 % 
8 2.49 % 3.59 % 0.44 % 
9 2.28 % 3.42 % 0.42 % 
10 2.12 % 3.18 % 0.41 % 
11 2.12 % 3.09 % 0.41 % 
12 1.98 % 2.47 % 0.39 % 
13 1.93 % 2.40 % 0.39 % 
14 1.73 % 2.11 % 0.39 % 
15 1.71 % 2.08 % 0.38 % 
16 1.61 % 1.94 % 0.38 % 
17 1.63 % 1.48 % 0.38 % 
18 1.58 % 1.42 % 0.37 % 
19 1.53 % 1.38 % 0.35 % 
20 1.52 % 1.29 % 0.34 % 
21 1.44 % 1.26 % 0.34 % 
22 1.42 % 1.21 % 0.29 % 
23 1.39 % 1.14 % 0.33 % 
24 1.35 % 1.04 % 0.33 % 
25 1.22 % 0.97 % 0.32 % 
26 1.21 % 0.80 % 0.32 % 
27 1.13 % 0.87 % 0.32 % 
28 1.10 % 0.81 % 0.32 % 
29 1.06 % 0.80 % 0.31 % 
30 1.02 % 0.78 % 0.29 % 
31 1.02 % 0.75 % 0.29 % 
32 0.96 % 0.74 % 0.29 % 
33 0.94 % 0.71 % 0.28 % 
34 0.85 % 0.66 % 0.28 % 
35 0.84 % 0.68 % 0.28 % 
36 0.75 % 0.63 % 0.28 % 
37 0.70 % 0.55 % 0.27 % 
38 0.75 % 0.53 % 0.26 % 
39 0.72 % 0.53 % 0.27 % 
40 0.70 % 0.50 % 0.27 % 
41 0.68 % 0.49 % 0.27 % 
42 0.68 % 0.48 % 0.26 % 
43 0.67 % 0.43 % 0.25 % 
44 0.66 % 0.37 % 0.25 % 
45 0.66 % 0.37 % 0.25 % 
46 0.65 % 0.35 % 0.25 % 
47 0.64 % 0.30 % 0.24 % 
48 0.64 % 0.29 % 0.24 % 
49 0.61 % 0.29 % 0.24 % 
50 0.62 % 0.29 % 0.24 % 
51   0.24 % 
52   0.23 % 
53   0.23 % 
54   0.23 % 
55   0.23 % 
56   0.23 % 
57   0.23 % 
58   0.22 % 
59   0.22 % 
60   0.22 % 
61   0.22 % 
62   0.22 % 
63   0.22 % 
(continued on next page) 
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(continued ) 
Top Seller Buyer Seller-Buyer 
64   0.22 % 
65   0.22 % 
66   0.21 % 
67   0.21 % 
68   0.21 % 
69   0.21 % 
70   0.21 % 
71   0.20 % 
72   0.20 % 
73   0.20 % 
74   0.20 % 
75   0.20 % 
76   0.20 % 
77   0.20 % 
78   0.20 % 
79   0.20 % 
80   0.20 % 
81   0.20 % 
82   0.20 % 
83   0.20 % 
84   0.20 % 
85   0.19 % 
86   0.19 % 
87   0.19 % 
88   0.19 % 
89   0.19 % 
90   0.19 % 
91   0.19 % 
92   0.19 % 
93   0.19 % 
94   0.18 % 
95   0.17 % 
96   0.18 % 
97   0.18 % 
98   0.18 % 
99   0.18 % 
Other 25.23 % 5.82 % 72.87 %  
Appendix 2 Estimation Results of Partial Parallel Ordered Logit Model  
Variable Estimate Std. Error  
Intercept:2 1.112 0.520 * 
Intercept:3 3.013 0.512 *** 
Intercept:4 3.986 0.538 *** 
Intercept:5 5.238 0.651 *** 
log (Starting-Price):2 − 0.601 0.176 *** 
log (Starting-Price):3 − 0.686 0.173 *** 
log (Starting-Price):4 − 0.532 0.181 *** 
log (Starting-Price):5 − 0.476 0.218 ** 
log (Daily-Quantity) − 0.123 0.018 *** 
log (Transaction-Quantity) − 0.117 0.011 *** 
log (Fish-Size) − 0.187 0.031 *** 
Quality 0.059 0.091  
Bottom-Trawl − 0.406 0.146 *** 
Longline − 0.298 0.140 ** 
Danish-Seine 0.009 0.152  
log (Storage-Time) 0.208 0.028 *** 
Year-2011 0.738 0.112 *** 
Year-2012 2.138 0.115 *** 
Year-2013 1.841 0.113 *** 
Year-2014 1.704 0.107 *** 
Year-2015 2.389 0.120 *** 
Year-2016 2.663 0.127 *** 
Year-2017 2.531 0.136 *** 
Year-2018 2.752 0.157 *** 
January − 0.606 0.087 *** 
February − 0.540 0.100 *** 
March − 0.762 0.106 *** 
April − 0.608 0.104 *** 
May − 0.723 0.100 *** 
June − 0.342 0.092 *** 
July − 0.455 0.098 *** 
August − 0.514 0.095 *** 
September − 0.329 0.091 *** 
(continued on next page) 
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(continued ) 
Variable Estimate Std. Error  
October − 0.623 0.078 *** 
November − 0.233 0.077 *** 
With seller dummies Yes    
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. For bidder number, the base is Bidders = 1. 
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